By Anna Harvey

In a January 2025 interview with Ana Tili newspaper, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev outlined his vision of Kazakhstan as a middle power balancing relations between global powers while pursuing domestic reforms. The analysis examines how Tokayev has moved to separate himself from his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, implementing constitutional changes, economic reforms, and foreign policy shifts following the January 2022 events, while facing the complex challenge of maintaining independence from both Russian and Chinese influence. Tokayev’s leadership marks a new stage of Kazakhstan’s development, positioning the country as an independent player on the global stage.

Photo by Vladimir Tretyakov

BACKGROUND: On January 3, 2025, the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev gave a written interview with Ana Tili newspaper reflecting on 2024 and discussing Kazakhstan’s future. In the interview, Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan's role as a "middle power" globally; its ties with the U.S., Russia, and China; Nazarbayev's legacy; economic development; and Kazakhstan's future goals. He also addressed the "January events," the January 2022 mass protests against gas prices that turned into an intra-elite fight and escalated into riots and violence.

In international politics, Tokayev expressed pride in Kazakhstan's "middle power" status, stating the country should "work collaboratively to build new, resilient bridges between conflicting geopolitical poles. Kazakhstan maintains support for the UN and other international organizations. Tokayev expressed optimism about relations with both the U.S. and China, noting Kazakhstan's willingness to support Washington regarding Ukraine and plans for extensive high-level dialogue with Beijing in 2025.

Regarding the former president, Tokayev characterized Nazarbayev's legacy as overwhelmingly positive and noted their strong relationship, including monthly phone calls. Despite his own efforts to reduce Russian influence in Kazakhstan, Tokayev expressed no concern about Nazarbayev's December meeting with Putin, describing such meetings as exchanges between "long-time friends and colleagues with much to reminisce about."

On the economic front, Tokayev praised Kazakhstan's progress while noting that "economic growth of 4 percent is insufficient." Rather than artificially holding exchange rates or micromanaging sectors, he stated his belief that the government should "ensure the stability and efficiency of the economy, the dynamic development of the real sector, growth in labor productivity, and the creation of high-quality jobs." He also supports recovering illegally obtained assets for reinvestment in education, infrastructure, and social needs.

Domestically, Tokayev highlighted extensive modernization projects in housing, roadways, railways, industry, and education. He also discussed the expansion of Kazakhstan’s social state: in 2024, the government began the National Fund for Children, where 50% of investment income from the National Fund of Kazakhstan will go to children's savings accounts for housing or education after age 18. Additionally, pensions, academic scholarships, and civil servant salaries were increased.  Tokayev also emphasized his government's rapid response to spring 2024 flooding and efforts to build a "Clean Kazakhstan" through environmental initiatives.

In response to a question about the January events, Tokayev affirmed that, had decisive actions “not been taken against the instigators of the riots and organizers of the coup, Kazakhstan today would be a very different country, with diminished independence and restricted sovereignty.” The January events in question began on January 1, 2022, and began as protests against hikes in energy prices in western Kazakhstan. These protests appeared to be co-opted into an intra-elite struggle pitting parts of Nazarbayev’s entourage, specifically in the security structures, against Tokayev’s government, and spiraled into violent riots. Tokayev responded by requesting peacekeeping forces from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) be deployed to suppress the rioters. In total, around 238 people were killed. Since the riots, Tokayev has used the memory of the events to support a number of governmental reforms, including strengthening the powers of parliament over the presidency. In his interview, the President encouraged citizens not to fall victim to disinformation related to the riots, and he later stated evidence of involvement from criminal groups in the January events was a driving force behind his efforts to strengthen law and order in Kazakhstan, a project labeled “Just Kazakhstan.”

IMPLICATIONS: Tokayev's interview reveals his continued efforts to establish an independent identity from his predecessor. Initially, Tokayev was depicted as largely a figurehead acting on behalf of Nazarbayev, in spite of clear indications that he was assertively pushing a reformist agenda against the resistance of elements of the “old guard.” Following the January 2022 events, he has made significant breaks from Nazarbayev's legacy through constitutional reforms, including stripping Nazarbayev's title of “Elbasy” (or national patriarch) and removing immunity protections for his family.

Further changes include increasing Kazakhstan’s presence on the world stage and decreasing reliance on Russia. Kazakhstan's “positive balance” policy (initially promoted by Tokayev in 1997, when he was Foreign Minister) has gained new significance, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Tokayev’s condemnation of the invasion, acceptance of Russian draft evaders, and pursuit of alternative pipelines have established Kazakhstan as a middle power outside Russia's sphere of influence. Regionally, Kazakhstan has increased its influence through initiatives like the Turkic World Vision-2040 program.

Kazakhstan is Central Asia's largest economy ($261.4M GDP in 2023). Under Tokayev, the country is actively diversifying away from Russian and Chinese influence, especially as a result of Russia’s damaged reputation following the invasion of Ukraine and public skepticism toward Chinese business practices. Seeking alternatives, Kazakhstan has successfully attracted Western investment, particularly from the United States ($65B invested), which sees Kazakhstan as a potential alternate rare-earth supplier and strategic partner in the region.

CONCLUSIONS: President Tokayev has evolved beyond his initial role as Nazarbayev's chosen successor, building a distinct legacy as revealed in his Ana Tili interview. His vision for Kazakhstan's future emphasizes its role as a middle power, balancing engagement with the United States, European Union, Russia, and China to maintain political and economic sovereignty. Under his leadership, Kazakhstan has strengthened its position by expanding regional ties and diversifying its interests beyond Russia and China.

However, significant challenges remain. Kazakhstan must navigate complex domestic power dynamics, including potential resistance from remaining elements of the old guard and public discontent, especially regarding economic opportunities. Meanwhile, Russia continues to pressure Kazakhstan to limit its independent foreign policy, while public skepticism of Chinese influence constrains economic partnerships. The success of economic diversification and domestic reforms will depend on Tokayev's ability to manage these internal and external pressures while maintaining Kazakhstan's sovereignty.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Anna Harvey is a Researcher at the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute and the American Foreign Policy Council. She received a Master of Arts in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from Stanford University. She has written for Newsweek, the U.S. Army War College War Room journal, and Postimees newspaper.

By Vali Kaleji

By promoting its concept of "Chinese-style modernization" (henceforth CSM) China seeks to project an image of economic development and growth in Central Asia that is non-hegemonic, non-interventionist, and non-imposing, positioning itself as an alternative to both Russian and Western models. Given that CSM is rooted in China's authoritarian communist framework, it aligns with the secular authoritarian structures of Central Asian states and the interests of the pro-Chinese oligarchic networks within the region. However, despite its foundations in Chinese tradition, Confucianism, a distinct interpretation of Marxism, and uneven development, China's model of economic development and CSM has yet to establish itself as the dominant paradigm in Central Asia.

BACKGROUND: The concept of CSM, formulated in the late 1970s, has gained significant attention among Chinese leadership and researchers since the start of this decade. The emphasis on distinguishing CSM from Western and Soviet models highlights the theoretical possibility of offering a new developmental perspective to other nations. It also encourages these countries to design independent modernization strategies tailored to their unique national characteristics.

As the world’s second-largest economic power, it is crucial for China to promote its model of development and modernization within the international sphere. In this context, the development and evolution of the concept of CSM are closely linked to other key concepts proposed by China over the past few decades, such as "Peaceful Rise" and "Peaceful Development," which offer alternatives to the dominant Western development model and modernization pathways. Since September 2021, Beijing has introduced no fewer than three “Global Initiatives” focusing on development, security, and civilization. Together with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), these initiatives now constitute the four pillars of President Xi Jinping’s “Community for a Shared Future” framework, which China promotes as a blueprint for “world peace and stability,” “a powerful driver of global development,” and a foundation for a “New World Order.”

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, during the transition from the Soviet development model to the Western one, the concept and model of CSM emerged as a potential alternative for Central Asian countries. While Western modernization paths emphasized liberal democratic values, transparency, a free-market economy, reduced state ownership, and the growth of private enterprises, CSM offered a different approach. It combined state control and ownership of key infrastructure with the expansion of private enterprises, notably without incorporating liberal democratic principles. The rapid and remarkable growth of China’s economy, its rising influence in global trade, and its emergence as the primary economic and trade partner of Central Asian nations—along with the One Belt, One Road initiative (the modern Silk Road) and the significant inflow of Chinese capital, labor, and companies into Central Asian markets—prompted Beijing to promote the Chinese modernization model within the region.

Given that CSM is rooted in China's authoritarian communist framework, it aligns closely with the secular authoritarian structures of Central Asian countries. This model, characterized by top-down development, differs from both Soviet and Western development approaches. Unlike the fully state-controlled development model of the Soviet era, it is not entirely government-driven, and unlike the Western model, it does not rely fully on private enterprise. Instead, it represents a hybrid system that blends state control with market-oriented mechanisms.

IMPLICATIONS: The CSM complements and strengthens China’s substantial investment and significant trade relations with Central Asia. Over the past 22 years, China has channeled approximately US$105 billion into the region through development financing, with the China Development Bank (CDB) serving as a key player in this process. By promoting CSM, Beijing appears to be aiming to stabilize and secure its investments while ensuring sustained commercial and economic influence in Central Asia.

Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, economic development and growth have been central to the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, an approach that can appeal to the authoritarian leaders of Central Asia seeking to enhance their own political legitimacy. CSM aligns with the interests of the pro-Chinese oligarchic network in Central Asia, encompassing a diverse range of actors, from politicians to owners and managers of both public and private enterprises. While the Western development model, based on a bottom-up approach, emphasizes transparency, CSM, characterized by a top-down approach often associated with ambiguity, lack of transparency, and, in many cases, corruption, is particularly attractive to the region’s oligarchic networks and shadow economy. Moreover, the thousands of Central Asian students who graduate annually from Chinese universities under Chinese government scholarships—especially in fields such as economics, business, management, and finance—play a crucial role in disseminating and promoting the CSM throughout the region.

CSM also serves as a key element of China’s "soft power," its so-called "Chinese Marshall Plan," and "soft hegemonism" in Central Asia. It aims to offer a development model tailored to the cultural, national, and ethnic values of the region, complementing China’s growing economic and commercial influence. By promoting this model, China seeks to project an image of non-hegemonic, non-interventionist, and non-imposing development, positioning it as an alternative to the Russian and Western models. Additionally, the promotion of CSM plays a crucial role in China’s strategy to counter rising anti-Chinese sentiment and Sinophobia in Central Asia. In this context, a Chinese researcher suggests that CSM, as a new form of modernization, emphasizes "human modernization" as its distinctive realization. This concept reflects China’s efforts to present a soft, humane image of development and modernization. 

Yet CSM in Central Asia faces significant constraints and obstacles. This model stems from a unique approach rooted in Chinese traditions, Confucian principles, and a distinct interpretation of Marxism, making it difficult to replicate effectively in other regions, including Central Asia. Even in Southeast Asian countries such as Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand—nations with stronger linguistic, historical, and cultural ties to China—the Western model of development and modernization has emerged as the dominant paradigm. Moreover, CSM adopts an unbalanced approach to development, prioritizing economic growth while neglecting political development. This imbalance reduces its appeal, particularly among the middle class and educated young people in Central Asia, who tend to favor parallel development and embrace the values associated with Western liberal democracy.

Furthermore, several additional obstacles hinder the establishment of CSM as a dominant and unrivaled model in Central Asia. These include widespread anti-Chinese sentiment, along with ethnic and religious sensitivities, particularly regarding China’s policies in Xinjiang. There is also significant criticism of the performance of Chinese companies and contractors operating in Central Asia, particularly concerning issues such as labor discrimination, where Chinese workers are often given preferential treatment over local workers, and Beijing’s debt trap diplomacy in the region. 

CONCLUSIONS: Although China has been the leading economic and trade partner of Central Asian countries for the past two decades, its economic development model has yet to establish itself as the dominant model in the region. Three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia continues to struggle with selecting a definitive development and modernization pathway. Various aspects of the Russian, Chinese, Western, and even the Turkish model—particularly after the Justice and Development Party came to power—have been adopted to varying degrees, but no single model has prevailed. Instead, the region operates within a mixed or hybrid framework, characterized by a blend of government control and authority, free-market principles, corruption and shadow economies, private sector activity, and foreign investment.

These circumstances are the outcome of a complex interplay of factors inherent in societies transitioning from tradition to modernity in Central Asia. Key among these factors are the challenges of reconciling religion, traditions, and ethnic and national beliefs with the demands of development and modernization, as well as the region’s unique political-economic structures. Additionally, the lack of consensus among leaders and ruling elites regarding the selection of a specific development model further complicates the process. The economic, financial, and commercial interests of the oligarchic network and the shadow economy also play a significant role in shaping the region’s developmental trajectory. To address or obscure these contradictions, regional leaders often emphasize the creation and promotion of a distinct, indigenous model of development and modernization tailored to their specific national contexts.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at   This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Farkhad Tolipov

January 29, 2025

The remnants of the Russian imperial modus vivendi is revealing in current Moscow’s manipulative policy in Central Asia where Moscow tries to embody its own version of Monroe Doctrine. This region looks like the last bastion of Russian imperialism. Uzbekistan, the biggest Central Asian country by population and the most central by location, provides an obvious illustrative case to observe and analyze this new/old regional order. Moscow’s manipulation of Uzbekistan and leverage-keeping policy is conducted with the help of a specific toolkit including propaganda, information attacks, geopolitical pressure and show visits.

Read Russia’s Central Asian Underbelly: The Case of Uzbekistan (PDF)

By Nargiza Umarova

In recent years, the Taliban government has successfully garnered the support of most Central Asian countries for the development of trans-Afghan transport infrastructure. Notably, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have demonstrated significant engagement in this endeavor, with each country advancing its own railway project traversing Afghanistan to reach the borders of Pakistan. These routes are expected to compete with one another, a dynamic that is anticipated to enhance their profitability through the implementation of flexible tariff policies aimed at maintaining sufficient cargo flow. The establishment of trans-Afghan rail corridors holds strategic significance not only for fostering connectivity between Central and South Asia but also for advancing Iran’s aspirations to develop efficient transportation links with China via Afghanistan—a goal that the Taliban government has expressed its willingness to support.

Photo by Pahari Sahib

BACKGROUND: In May 2023, Afghan authorities approved the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar railway corridor project, which spans 1,468 kilometers. A year later, plans were announced for the construction of the Spin Boldak-Kandahar railway, signaling the intention to extend the Kandahar route to Pakistan. Turkmenistan promptly capitalized on this development by proposing an alternative version of the Trans-Afghan Corridor, extending along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak route.

Subsequently, Kazakhstan joined the project at the invitation of Ashgabat, and in September 2024, the foundation was laid for a 22-kilometer railway line connecting the border station of Torghundi to Sanobar. This section will serve as the initial segment of the Torghundi-Herat transport corridor.

The Turkmen version of the trans-Afghan railway is regarded as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor (the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway), although the latter route is significantly shorter. Competition between the western route (originating from Turkmenistan's border) and the eastern route (originating from Uzbekistan's border) appears inevitable. However, this competition is expected to yield positive outcomes, particularly through the reduction of transportation costs resulting from the launch of additional trade routes through Afghanistan. This cost efficiency is a critical factor driving the interest of external stakeholders in the development of trans-Afghan transport infrastructure.

The establishment of the Torghundi-Spin Boldak international transport corridor holds particular importance for Tehran, which intends to develop a railway link with Afghanistan through the border town of Zaranj.

Since 2020, as part of the broader development of Iran's deep-sea port of Chabahar, construction has been underway on the Chabahar-Zahedan railway. This railway is planned to extend further into Afghanistan, reaching the provinces of Nimroz and Kandahar. Recently, Afghan authorities announced the completion of engineering surveys for the construction of the Zaranj-Kandahar railway. This integrated infrastructure will provide Iran with an additional avenue to access Afghanistan, while also establishing a direct connection to Herat—one of Afghanistan's largest and most strategically significant cities.

Tehran’s long-term strategic vision positions Herat as a pivotal hub for transit routes connecting Western, Central, and Eastern Asia. This perspective stems from the concept of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway corridor, commonly referred to as the "Five Nation Road." Iran has already initiated the practical implementation of this vision through the construction of the Khaf-Herat railway, which is scheduled to become operational in 2025. Once completed, the route will extend to Kashgar in China via Central Asia, covering an approximate distance of 2,000 kilometers.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran has consistently encouraged Afghan authorities to collaborate with their Central Asian partners in advancing the railway corridor connecting Khaf to Kashgar.

In 2017, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan reached an agreement to construct the Mazar-i-Sharif-Sheberghan-Maimana-Herat railway. Integrating this new route with the Khaf-Herat railway would enable Uzbekistan to establish an alternative transit corridor to Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf countries, bypassing Turkmenistan. Additionally, this development would have a substantial impact on the implementation of the Five Nation Transit Route, as the Khaf-Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway constitutes a critical segment of the Afghan portion of this corridor. From Mazar-i-Sharif, transportation links would only need to be extended to Sherkhan Bandar in Kunduz province to connect with Tajikistan's border.

However, in 2018, Tashkent introduced a new trans-Afghan railway project toward Pakistan, known as the Kabul Corridor, effectively placing the implementation of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat route on hold. This decision was likely influenced by the recognition that the railway to Herat could undermine Uzbekistan’s transit interests. By prioritizing the Kabul Corridor, Uzbekistan sought to secure its role in servicing freight flows from China, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to Iran, Turkey, and Europe.

Despite these developments, progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway corridor continued. In 2019, Afghanistan and Tajikistan signed an agreement to construct the Jaloliddini Balkhi (Kolkhozobod)-Panji Poyon-Sherkhan Bandar railway. To finance the feasibility study for this project, Dushanbe sought assistance from prominent international donor organizations, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

At that time, establishing a railway connection between Afghanistan and Tajikistan was also pivotal for the development of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan (TAT) transport corridor, initiated in 2013. This corridor extends from the Tajik border into northern Afghanistan, passing through the cities of Kunduz, Khulm, Mazar-i-Sharif, Sheberghan, and Andkhoy. At the Akina checkpoint, the railway crosses into Turkmenistan, from where it can connect to the Caspian Sea. This route aligns with the concept of reviving the ancient Lapis Lazuli Corridor, which aims to provide Afghanistan with direct access to European markets via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

In 2016, Turkmenistan completed the first stage of the TAT railway, spanning the Atamurat (Kerki)-Ymamnazar-Akina route. By early 2021, the Akina-Andkhoy railway line also became operational. However, the abrupt change of power in Afghanistan during the summer of 2021 led to the suspension of work on these projects. This pause stemmed from uncertainty regarding the Taliban government's approach to relations with neighboring countries and its foreign policy on transport communications. Yet contrary to initial expectations, the new leadership in Afghanistan adopted a notably more pragmatic stance on these matters.

The Taliban have reactivated nearly all regional and interregional transport projects. Announcements have been made regarding the planned launch of the Andkhoy-Sheberghan and Sheberghan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway lines in the coming years, as well as the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway. These initiatives aim to bridge critical gaps in major trade corridors, including the TAT and the Five Nation Railway Route.

Notably, even Tajikistan, despite its tough stance toward the Afghan government, has become more active in advancing trans-Afghan transport initiatives. In July 2024, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) signed a protocol to develop a feasibility study for a 51-kilometer Jaloliddini Balkhi-Panji Poyon railway, which will connect to Afghanistan via the Sherkhan Bandar checkpoint. As previously mentioned, this railway will form part of the TAT.

Integration into such international transport corridors will offer Tajikistan a strategic advantage on southern transit routes. However, the modernization of existing infrastructure and the construction of new railways demand significant financial resources, which Dushanbe struggles to provide. Tajikistan relies heavily on China for foreign investment. Beijing has a vested interest in developing fast and efficient transportation routes to access emerging markets in South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

If the Taliban succeed in persuading Tajikistan to collaborate on developing trade routes to China, this could significantly reshape Central Asia's transport architecture while enhancing Afghanistan's strategic importance as a regional transit hub. Iran would also benefit from a direct connection to China that bypasses Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

For Tashkent, however, this development could present a serious challenge given the resolve of its neighbors to complete the TAT. 

CONCLUSIONS: The proactive efforts of the Taliban government in developing international transport links has heightened the interest of most Central Asian states (with the exception of Tajikistan) in strengthening trade and economic ties with Kabul. This includes the potential implementation of joint investment projects, such as the construction of railways, gas pipelines, and power lines, which could foster regional connectivity and economic growth.

External major powers are also eager to capitalize on these transformations, but their interference in establishing trans-Afghan transport infrastructure could have adverse consequences for Central Asia.

Iran’s ambitions to establish a transport corridor to China via Afghanistan pose the potential to alter the balance of power within the regional transit system. Such a development would bolster the positions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are currently in a transport deadlock and reliance on Uzbekistan for access to global markets.

The development of new trade routes through Afghanistan represents a positive trend that will inevitably influence Central Asia due to the region’s geographical proximity. This shift offers regional states the opportunity to enhance their transit and trade capacities, albeit accompanied by increased competition. To mitigate the risks of intense rivalries, the Central Asian republics must reconcile their interests in light of Afghanistan’s growing significance as a transit hub and formulate a coordinated strategy to advance interregional transport corridors, ensuring equitable benefits across the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution  “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Her research activities are focused on studying developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of big powers on this process. She also explores the current policy of Uzbekistan on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

Johan Engvall

January 22, 2025

In a time of geopolitical uncertainty, the South Caucasus and Central Asia have become more interconnected, forming a new Trans-Caspian area. As trade along the Middle Corridor is gaining in importance, the Caspian Sea is becoming a unifier rather than divider of the regions. All countries on the eastern and western side of the Caspian pursue multi-vector foreign policies to avoid overreliance on any single external actor. As the EU is seeking to assert itself geopolitically, it is in its strategic interest to support the evolving Trans-Caspian cooperation. To elevate its engagement with the countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the EU should replace the outdated Eastern Partnership with a new Trans-Caspian Partnership. Such partnership would enhance regional connectivity and cooperation and give regional states greater collective weight in their dealings with different powers.

Read The Convergence of the South Caucasus and Central Asia (PDF)